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MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, EXPECTED INFLATION
AND CONTRACT LENGTH
by
G. Marini and P. Scaramozzino
ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the explicit consideration of the "expected inflation
effect" makes it more likely that increases in wage and price flexibility
reduce employment variability. This result, obtained in a variant of a
model with synchronized contracts presented by Ball, casts doubts on some
existing consensus in the literature pointing towards the opposite view.
Wage and price flexibility, although ceteris varibus desirable, is however




The renewed appeal of the "neo-Keynesian" account of economic
fluctuations (see, for example, McCallum (1986)) has stimulated an
important area of research directed at providing sound microeconomic
underpinnings for the rigidity of wages and prices. As stressed by
Blanchard (1988), Keynesian macroeconomics came under attack in the early
seventies mainly for the difficulty of producing satisfactory theoretical
foundations rather than its capability to explain the businesa cycle. If
frictions in the labour and goods markets are the culprits for the
observed fluctuations in economic activity, the obvious and most telling
criticism is why agents do not make an effort in trying to remove them.
This ís the essence of Barro's (1977) argument (see Fischer, 1988),
questioning the theoretical and practícal relevance of the neo-Keynesian
approach. Substantial progress has recently been achieved in developing
macroeconomic models based on monopolistic competition and near-rational
behaviour (see, for example, Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Ball (1987),
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), and the reviews by Blanchard (1988) and
Fischer (1968)). Price and wage rigidities can be compatible with
optimising behavíour of individual agents, although undesirable
fluctuations inevitably emerge in the aggregate.
Appropriate macroeconomic cures would appear to be either active
demand management or, if at all feasible, sweeping rigidities in the
labour and goods markets away. However, it has long been known that
increased wage and price flexibility is not necessarily a good thing.
Reducing rigiditíes in the labour and goods markets may exacerbate cycles
in economic activity in a non-Walrasian world. For example, Keynes (1936,
p.270) argued that the "money wage level as a whole should be maintained
as stable as possíble, at any rate in the short period". One of the main
reasons against price flexibility is that the stabilizing effects of
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changes in the price level could well be outweighted by the destabilizing
effects on aggregate demand of changes in the expected rate of change in
the price level. In other words, price flexibility may not only be an
unsatisfactory substitute for active demand management but could also lead
to greater rather than lower output and employment fluctuations for given
monetary and fiscal policies. A proper formalízation of these ideas was
provided in Tobin's (1975) analysis of the destabilizing effects of wage
flexibility in a dynamic context under the hypothesis of adaptive
expectations. The íssue of the stabilization effects of price flexibility
has recently been re-examined both at the theoretical (DeLong and Summers
(1986b), Driskill and Sheffrin (1986), Blanchard (1988)) and empirical
level (DeLong and Summers (1986a), Summers and Wadhwani (1987)). The
theoretical analysis has concentrated on versions of Taylor's (1979, 1980)
staggered wages framework. The prevailing consensus in the literature
(see, e.g. DeLong and Summers (1986b) and Blanchard (1988)) is that, when
inflation expectations and demand shocks are properly taken into account,
increased price flexibility may well be destabilizing. The explanation
for this result is that, while price flexibility is in one sense
stabilizing, the associated change in expected inflation and thus in the
ex-ante real interest rate ie destabilizíng. The latter effect would seem
to dominate the former, re-establishing thus the validity of the ideas
expressed by Keynes (1936) and Fisher (1923, 1925) and, to some extent,
reproducing in a rational expectations framework the results obtained by
Tobin (1975) under adaptive expectations. DeLong and Summers (1986b)
present simulation results and interpret them as confirming this víew.
It should be noted that Taylor's (1979) oríginal model inevitably
yields the prediction that an increased responsiveness of wages to excess
demand conditions would be stabilizing. It is also worth pointing out
that the possíbility of destabílizing price flexibility presented by
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DeLong and Summers (1986b) requíres not only some restríctions on
parameter values but also demand shocks to be autoregressive and not
approaching a random walk.l
This still largely unsettled issue is undoubtedly of considerable
importance for macroeconomic analysis and policy design (see Blanchard
(1988), Fischer (1988)). However, to our knowledge, it has not attracted
yet the deserved attention in the literature. We propose to further
investigate this problem together with the effectiveness of
countercyclical monetary rules in a variant of a model presented by Ball
(1987). This model is particularly interesting, since it is explicitly
based on monopolistic competition and therefore offers a satisfactory
framework for the analysis of the externalities associated with the
existence of contracts. Ball's (1987) claim that wages are too rigid can
be interpreted as basically replícating the results emerging from the
original Taylor's (1979) model, that is increased wage flexibility, now in
the form of reduced contract length, would be stabilízing. It is of
interest, therefore, to verify whether explicitly modelling anticipated
inflatíon could produce possible destabilizing effects along the lines
described by DeLong and Summers (1986b). Our analytical results show that
the expected inflation effect unambiguously strengthens the case for
reducing contract length, írrespective of the nature and degree of
persistence of demand and supply shocks. It is formally demonstrated that
the negative externalities associated with long contracts actually
increase. We also show that leaníng against the wind policies can be
extremely powerful if and only lf the expected inflation effect is present.
The scheme of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a version
of Ball's (1987) model modified to explicitly incorporate the expected
inflation effect and demonstrates thet íncreased wage flexibility ís
likely to be stabilizing. Section 3 considers the case of autoregressive
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demand shocks and relates the results to earlier findíngs in the
literature. Section 4 illustrates how lagged feedback monetary rules can
be effective only in preaence of the expected inflation effect and
compares their relative desirability versus increasing wage flexibility.
A summary of the main results i s provided in the concluding Section S.
2. Exyected inflation and waee flexibilitv
We now provide an appraisal of the expected inflation effect upon
aggregate demand, in a rational expectations model with predetermined
labour contracta.2 The specific framework chosen is a variant of the
discrete time version of Ball's (1987) model of long-term contracts under
monopolistic competition, modified to incorporate inflatíon expectations.
Our aim is to evaluate the implications for employment variability of a
shift in the economy from short to longer term contracts.
In a standard monopolistically competitive envíronment, an individual
firm's labour demand depends on the firm's real wage and on aggregate
demand (see e.g. Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987). An increase ín the
average contract length in the economy makes nomínal wages and prices less
responsive to aggregate demand shocks: this dampens the variability of
the real wage over the cycle, but exacerbates the variability of aggregate
demand. The net effect of longer contracts on the variance of the demand
for labour and hence of output will therefore depend on the relative
weight of real wages and demand for goods in the firm's labour demand. A
single firm decides on the length of the contract with its workers,
neglecting the consequences that its decision will have on the aggregate
wage and price levels. In so doing, it creates externalities upon the
other firms. Ball (1987) shows that shorter contracts than the
equilibrium ones would be socially optimal if and only if an increase in
contract length creates negatíve externalities to the single firms, in the
S
sense of increasing the variability of the responses of employment and
output to nominal shocks.3
We now show that a negative dependence of aggregate demand on the
ex-ante real interest rate makes it more likely, in the present context,
that increases in contract length generate negative externalities compared
to a situation in which this effect is absent; ín other words, increased
wage and price flexibility i a more likely to be desirable4. The intuition
behind this result ís fairly simple: under a long-term contract regime
the current price level does not respond to current innovations which are
instead always incorporated ín the current expectations of the next period
price level. Hence, the presence of expected inflation in the labour
demand increases the volatility of employment and output over the cycle as
labour contracts become longer.
The structure of the model is as follows. The technology of the
economy is summarized by the following constant returns to scale
production function
(1) Yit ' Qit
where "i" is a firm-specific index, uníformly dis[ributed over [0,1], and
where yit and Qit are the logs of output and labour input respectively.
The log of the money supply follows the process
(2) mt - mt-i } f t
where Ft i s a whíte noise with variance a~. The disturbance ft is an
exogenous nomínal shock, not controllable by the monetary authorities.
The aggregate demand ís given bys
(3) Yt - a (mt - Pt) } ~ (Etptt~ - Pt) ' tlt
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where yt and pt are aggregate output and price, respectively:
i r ~
Yt ' Yitdi Pt ' 1 Pitdi0 0
and where r~t is a white noise with variance a~. Et xt}s is the~
expectation of the variable xt}s conditíonal on the informatíon set at
time t, which contains the atructure of the model and all past and current
values of the relevant variables; in particular, agents can directly
observe the two different demand shocks Et and ~t, The real aggregate
demand shock, ~t, ís assumed to be serially uncorrelated; this assumption
will be relaxed in the next section, where our results will be compared
with other results in the literature. In (3), the coefficient ~ ~ 0
represents the negative effect on aggregate demand of expectations of
decreasing ínflation.
The firms operate under conditions of monopolistíc competition. The
share of firm "i"'s demand is
(4) Yit - Yt ' - Y (Pit - Pt)
where y ~ 1. Substituting (3) into (4) we obtain
(5) Yit ' a (mt - Pt) f ~ (Et Ptfi - Pt) - Y (Pit - Pt) t ~Jt
Using (1) and (5), the profit maximizing demand for labour of firm "i" isb
(6) Qit ' a (mt - Pt) t Ij (Et Ptti - Pt) - y(wit - Pt) t~It
where wit is the nominal wage. The síze of the labour pool of firm "i" is
assumed to be wage inelastic and is normalized to zero for analytícal
convenience. The market clearing level of employment is thus Qit - p.
The losses from the díscrepancy between actual labour demand and its
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market clearing level are given by the following quadratic function:
(~) zit - E I (Qit - Qit)~]
We can now examine the behaviour of wages, prices and employment under
different contracting regimes. Formally, we consider contracts spanníng
eíther one or two periods and analyse how the losa function and the value
of the externalíties are affected in each case when S i 0, that is when
the expected inflation effect upon aggregate demand is present, compared
to a situatíon in which such an effect is absent, that is
~- 0. Using (1), (5) and (6) and aggregating, one obtains
(8) Pt - wt
where wt is the aggregate nominal wage.
When all firms sign contracts which last one period only, they are
virtually executing spot contracts and can therefore fix employment at the
,tmarket clearing level: Qit - Qit ' 0, which obviously implies zit - 0.
From ( 6) and pit - 0 we have
(9) a ( af~l ~ 1wit -,~, mt f ll -.Y 1 Pt t,1, EtPtti t.Y ~It
Aggregating and using ( 8) one obtains
(10) Pt -~~ mt t a~ EtPtti t~ Ot
Equation (10) can be solved by the method of undetermined coefficients




Considez now the case in which all firms predetermine wages for two
periods. There i s no staggering: all contracts are perfectly
synchronized. In the first period, wages are set at the market clearing
level and thus equations (9) and (11) still hold true. In the second
period wages are set at the level for which Et-i(Qit) - 0. Taking
conditional expectations of the labour demand (6) and rearranging we obtain
(12) - Y ( ntR 1 ~ 1
wit Et-~ mt } ll - J Et-i Ptt ~, Et-i Ptti t:Y Et-i ~It
After aggregating and using (8) the solution for the price level turns out
to be
(13) Pt - mt-,
We can now address the issue of the value of externalities in each
regíme. Since each firm has zero measure, the externalities are defined
as 'the effects on firm "i" of a change in the contract lengths of other
firms' (Ball, 1987, p.619). If the net externalities from an increase in
contract length are negative, then it would be optimal for a social
planner to reduce, if possible, the length of the contracts, thereby
íncreasing the degree of flexibility of wages and prices. We show that
the presence of the expected inflation effect on aggregate demand makes it
indeed more likely that negative externalities might arise.
Let all firms, with the exception of firm "i", move from one to
two-period labour contracts. Zf firm "i" is in a one-period contract, or
in the first period of a two-period contract, then the conditíon 2it - 0
implies that there cannot be any externalities from the behaviour of other
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firms, since any increase in their contract length will be exactly offset
by firm "i". Hence, externalities can only occur in the second period of
a two-period contract.
Suppose now that all other firms are in a one-period contract, and
firm "i" is in the second period of a two-period contract. Equation (11)
for the aggregate price level stlll holds true, aince firm "i"'s behaviour
cannot affect aggregate magnitudes. Together with the wage setting
equation (12), this implies
(14) wit ' mt-~




(16) zit) - y~ oE } ~ a~l
(a-.R)
The loss function zi~) is a decreasine functíon of the parameter S:
the variability of employment and output i s lower the more responsive
aggregate demand is to changes in expected ínflation.
The íntuition of this result is straightforward. All other firms
observe the current realizatíons of the stochastic shocks and can thus
replicate the competitive solutíon. Wagea and prices fully reflect
changed demand conditions. The only externality for firm "i" is due to
real wage variability. Since its nominal wage i s predetermíned, the
welfare loss is monotonically related to the variance of the aggregate,
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non-predetermined, price level. Following exogenous demand shocks, the
price level will change less since expected inflation varies
anticyclically and exerta thus a built-in stabilizing effect on aggregate
demand.
Let us now assume that all other firms are in a two-period contract.
Equations (12) and (13) imply
(17) wit ' mt-~
By substitution ín (6), we obtain
pit ' (a t ~) Ft } Ot
zit) -(a f 6)~ a~ } an
The loss zi~) ís now an increasine function of the expected inflatíon
effect (as measured by ~). In this case externalities arise only from
variability in real aggregate demand, since the price level is
predetermined. Expected inflation now varies procyclically (following
demand shocks) and thus amplifies the destabilizing effects of the
exogenous disturbances. The expected inflation effect acts now as an
automatic destabilizer.
It followa from (16) and (19) that the necessary and sufficient
condition for negative externalities from an íncrease ín contract
length (i.e., the condition for zit) t zit)) is
(20) Y ~at~
Condition (20) has an immediate ínterpretation in terms of the parameters
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of equations (3) and (4). Long-term contracts have a negative net
externality if the real wage elasticity of the demand for labour, y, is
lower than the sum of the elasticities of aggregate demand with respect to
real money balances, a, and expected inflation, ~. The presence of the
last term reduces the externalities from short-term contracts and
increases the externalities from long-run contracts, thereby making it
more likely that the latter are not socially desirable.
The reason why a greater wage and price variability might be
preferable is that long contracts, whilst reducing the variability of real
wages over the cycle, also enhance the volatility of real money balances
and expected inflation: nomínal príces are predetermined and do not
respond to current shocks, which are instead incorporated in the nominal
money level and in inflation expectations.
It should be stressed that out analysls could be criticized on the
grounds that the one-period contract regime i s observationally equivalent
to the Walrasian case. As noted by DeLong and Summers (1986b, 1988), it is
hardly surprísing that the expected inflation effect i s stabilizing in a
situation of perfect markets. However, our results do not depend on the
particular specífication employed, as shown in Appendix B where both
contracting regimes are lagged one period. It is demonstrated that the
necessary and sufficient condition for negative externalities when the
contract length increases i s unchanged. Without loss of generality we can
thus retain the much aimpler framework adopted so far for Che following
discussion.
3. Persistent demand shocks and externalities
In the previous section we have considered white noise disturbances to
aggregate demand. It has been argued by DeLong and Summers (1986b),
however, that in a Taylor-type framework with autoregressive demand shocks
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the expected inflation effect has a destabilizing influence on the level
of output. The variance of output is shown to increase, over a certain
range of parameter values, as wages become more responsive to excess
demand in the goods market or as the length of contracts decreases. In
the case of serially uncorrelated disturbances, however, wage flexibility
is still atabilizing as in the original Taylor's (1980) model. Hence,
some elements of persistence ín the demand shocks appear to be necessary
in order to generate a destabilízation outcome.
In order to investigate this issue in a framework as similar as
possible to the model of Del.ong and Summera (1986b), we assume that the
aggregate demand shock pt in equation (3) follows a stationary AR(1)
process:
(21) ~t - p Ot-i t ~t
where 0~ p~ 1 and ct is white noise with variance oÉ. Our model is now
given by equations (1) -(7) and (21), and can also be interpreted as a
particular case of a policy rule reacting to the contemporaneous nominal
interest rate.
Usíng the same solution procedure as before, we find that in
one-period contracts the aggregate price level is given by
(22) 1Pt-mt}~~vt
while in two-period contracts it is glven by
(23) pt - mt- t Pa~~ nt-i
If all firms, wíth the exception of firm ~i", are ín a one-period contract
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while firo "1" is in the second period of a two-period contract, the wage
set by the latter i s equal to
and
Pwit - mt-i t at -p ~1t-i
pit - Y ~t '
:
(26) zit) ~ 1'~ oF t y z oc
[atR(1-P) ]
If instead all other firms are in a two-period contract, then
(27) wit - pt ' mt-i t at~~) ~It-i
whence
. n; P ~(28) Qii - (nt~) ft a}~ t
and
(29) zit) -(~R) 2Q~ ~t l af~~-P)1 ~ oE
From (26) and (29) it is apparent that the value of the externalities
in either regime is an increasing function of the autoregressive parameter
p, provided S t 0. The persistence of demand shocks can thus actually
increase the volatility of employment and output in presence of the
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expected inflation effect. When demand shocks are autoregressive,
expected ínflation varies less in the short contract case (when it is
stabilizing) and varies more when the price level is predetermined (that
is, when it is destabilizing). This does not imply, of course, that
increased wage flexibility in the form of shorter contracts may now be
destabilizing. Inspection of (26) and (29) immediately reveals that the
necessary and sufficient condition for negative externalities from an
increase in contract length is
(30) ry ~ a t ~
which exactly coincides with the condition (20) obtained in the case of
serially uncorrelated demand disturbances, that is when p- 0. The
condition is unchanged because the lower stabilizing influence of the
expected inflation effect in the short contracts regime is exactly
compensated by the greater destabílizing effects 1n the longer contracts
case (see equations (A22b) and (A25b) in Appendix A). The persistence of
demand shocks, therefore, does not affect the relative desirability of
short versus long-term contracts from a welfare point of view. In
particular, the presence of the expected inflation effect still makes it
more likely that shorter contracts might be preferred to longer ones, in
the sense that they minimize the externalitíes arising from the existence
of contracts in the economy.8
4. Active volicv and welfare
As demonstrated in the previous sections, increased wage flexibility,
in the form of reduced contract length, is more likely to be stabilizing
in presence of the expected inflation effect under a passive monetary
policy of the kind presented by Driskill and Sheffrin (1986) and DeLong
and Summers (1986b). The conclusíon emerging from our analysis is th.at
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eíther institutional reforms or policies aimed at penalizing longer
contracts, if feasible, ought to improve welfare.
We now turn to the issue of what active demand management can do ín
such a framework. We investigate the effectiveness of a leaning against
the wind policy, that is a rule designed to alter the rate of growth of
money around a fixed trend (here normalized to zero, for simplicity) in
response to lagged excess demand conditíons. Specifically, we assume that
the monetary authorities relate the rate of growth of the money supply to
the lagged values of the random shocks, which are here assumed to be white
noise processes9:
(31) mt ' mt-i } ft - ó~ Ft-i - a~ nt-i
If all firms follow one-period contracts, the aggregate price level is
given by
(32) Pt - mt - a~ó Et f af~á nt
which clearly collapses to equation (11) when b~ - bz - 0. If by contrast
all firms sign two-period contracts, the price level becomes a
predetermined variable:
(33) pt - mt-, - b,ft-, - óz ~t-,
which again reduces to (13) for ó~ - óz - 0. If now all firms are in a
one-period contract while firm "i" is in Che second period of a two-period
contract, we have
(34) wit - mt-i di ~t-i - á~ ~t-i
16
and
(35) Qit - ~ { [a t ~ ( 1-bi)~ ~t } ( 1 - ~ óz) nt }
and thus
(36) zit) - i y~c2 {[a t g(1-ó,)j'o~ t(1-~óz)~on }
It is apparent from (35) and (36) that the monetary authority can
reduce to zero the externalities by setting
(37a) b~ - a}~
~
(37b)
For the countercyclical policy to be at all viable it must be 5~0: the
presence of the expected inflation effect ín the aggregate demand is a
necessary condition for the effectiveness of (lagged feedback) active
demand management.
If all firms are in the second períod of a two-period contract, then
wit ' Pt ' mt-i - ái ~c-i - bz~t-i
Qit - [a t ~ (1-b,)~ ~t t (1-~b2) ~t
and
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(40) zi~) - [a t ~ (1-ó~)]'a~ t (1-~ó~)~a~
The optimal policy rule i s again given by (37a) and (37b). Under this
rule, the policy authority makes the choice of contract length completely
irrelevant. This can be seen by substituting (31), (37a) and (37b) into
the one-period price (32):
(41) t ~Pt - mt-i - ó~ ft-~ - áz nt-~
Under the optimal countercyclical policy, the one-period price will be
identical to the two-períod príce (33)10
The intuition of the reault ís the following. Under a passive
monetary growth rule, expected inflation is unaffected by the systematic
component of monetary policy (see equationa (A12b) and (A13b) in the
Appendix). A countercyclical rule, on the other hand, affects expected
inflation (equations (A36b) and (A39b)); it thus follows that
externalities can be eliminated by optimally choosing the values of the
feedback parameters. The channel for policy effectiveness is the
existence of a non-predeterminedll intertemporal substitution term12, that
is the expected inflation effect.
The policy objective is to stabilize aggregate demand in the face of
stochastic shocks; this is achieved by manipulating monetary growth and
thus expected inflation in such a way as to choke off the effects of
random disturbances on real aggregate demand. In other words, the ex-post
price in the short-term contracts regime is forced to be the same as in
the case of longer contracts. Perfect stabilization of aggregate demand
thus makes the price level a predetermined variable in either case.
Actíve policy can so replicate the first best of the economy irrespective
of the actual length of contracts. In this sense we can reaffirm the
18
validity of the Keynesian prediction that increased wage flexibility is an
imperfect substitute for active policy.l3
5. Conclusions
In a synchronized wage setting framework, the explicit consideration
of the expected inflation effect makes employment variability more likely
to increase with contract length. A greater wage flexibility, in the form
of reduced contract length, would appear to be desirable for a given
conduct of demand management.
However, we have shown that leaning agaínst the wind monetary rules
can reduce the externalities arising from the existence of contracts,
irrespective of their length. The Keynesian prediction that increased




1. It could easily be shown, for example, that, in presence of white noise
demand shocks, increased price flexfbillty would be stabilizing even
ín Taylor's model augmented for the expected inflation effect. In
such a case, in fact, the analytical "stabilizing" resulta obtained by
Driskill and Sheffrin (1986) in absence of demand shocks would be
qualitatively replícated.
2. T'his set-up can be justified on the grounds that transaction costs can
prevent agents from signing contracts which are contingent upon
current economic conditions (as ín Fischer, 1977).
3. Following the literature (see e.g. Barro, 1977) the ad hoc policy
criterion chosen is minimising the fluctuations of actual employment about
íts market clearing level. A rigorous analysis of welfare in this kind of
models is rather difficult, as shown by Ball and Romer (1987).
4. Ball (1987) compares the length of the contracts chosen by the firm in
a decentralized economy (Nash eauilibrium) in Che presence of fixed
(exogenously gíven) contracting costs to the Pereto--optimal contract
length. In equilíbrium, the firms equate the gains from a shorter
length to the increase in contracting costs. The presence of negative
externalities implies that shorter contracts would bring about net
welfare gains and therefore would be socially desirable.
5. Equation (3) can be seen as the reduced form of a standard IS-LM model
(see e.g. DeLong and Summers, 1986b, and Blanchard, 1988).
6. See Appendix A.
7. Details of this and later proofs can be found in Appendix A.
8. As argued by King (1988), one of the reasons why the inflation effect
is destabílizing in the Del.ong and Summers (19866) framework is that
current prices never respond to the contemporaneous demand shocks.
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King allows for a contemporaneous response by assuming the existence
of a sector of the labour marke[ which ís not covered by contracts.
It is not clear, however, how a non-contract sector can be reconciled
with the existence of s contract sector in the economy (see also
DeLong and Summers, 1988).
9. The relevant model is thus the one presented in section 2.
10. From the comparison of (36) with (40), one could immediately see
that, whenever
(b~, áI) i (b~, bz)
the necessary and sufficient condition for negative externalities from
an increase in contract length is still y~ n t~, If the monetary
authorities follow a different policy than the optimal one, the
relative losses associated with the externalitíes in the short and the
long-term regimes are unchanged.
11. Following Buiter's (1982) classification, a variable is
non-predetermined if and only if "its current value is a function of
current anticipations of future values of endogenous and~or exogenous
variables".
12. The same condition would ensure policy effectiveness even for
"contract-free" new classical macroeconomic models, as shown in Mariní
(1985, 1986, 1988) and Buiter (1987).
13. Perfect stabilization is of course not achievable when current
shocks are not contemporaneously observable. Hovewer the result
that active policy dominate increased wage flexibility still holds,
as demonstrated in Appendix B.3.
zl
Anvendix A
1. Demand for labour
The output demand for firm "i" is assumed to be
(A1) Yit - lPtJn ll } 7tJs LPPtJ~ Ht
where xr -(Et Ptt - Pt) ~Pt and where capital letters denote
antilogarithms. Profits are then given by
(Y-')~1' M a~Y g p R~Y ~~7
(A2) rtit - Pt Lit l Pt J l t
Pttil Ht - Wit Lit




~ P i ~~y j ~ j~Iy (EcPtt~ d~y x'~y - wy t it l Pt 1 l Pt ~ t it
Lit - l~J~ l P Jn
lEtPttfi~s (~~~ Ht




The 'guess' solution is
(A4) pt - 'omt t 'iTlt
Upon taking expectationa,
(AS) EtPtai ' ToEtmtti t tt ~Itti
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using (2) and the assumption that nt is a whíte noise. Substituting (AS)
into (10) we obtain
(A6) n t Sx~ 1Pt ~s mt t ~ nt
Equating (A4) to (A6) one has
(A~) xo - 1 x' - 1
~~
which yield equation (11) in the text.
(111) Two-neriod contracts
(AS)
Aggregate equation (12) and use (8) to obtain
Pt ' ;Y ~t-i t ~1 - ~~~ Et-iPt t ~ Et-iPtti
The guess solution is
(A9) Pt ~ xo mt-i
Substituting (A9) into (A8) we obtain
(A10) Pt - ~Y (1 - ro) t 'o~ IDt-,




If all other firms sign one-peziod contracts, then the wage for firm
"í" is given by (12) while the aggregate price level is given by (11).
Since Et-~Pt ' Et-iPtti ' mt-~, we obtain
(All) wit ' mt-i







EtPtti - Pt ' - at ~It
1
wit - Pt ' - f t - ~ ~7t
from which we obtain equation (15).
If instead the other firms are in the second period of a two-period





EtPtti - Pt ' ft
wit - Pt ' 0




The price equation is (10), which is here reported for
convenience:
(10) Pt - a 1~~ mt t ~~ EtPtti t ~~ ~it
The guess solution is
(A14) Pt ' xo mt t xt Ot
Take expectations of (A14) usíng (21):
(A14') EtPtti ' to mt t xtPnt
After substituting into (10), one has
(A15) pt ~ ~a IDt } 1~1 ~1t
Equate (A14) and (A15) to obtain
(A16) xo - 1 1xt - atR t-P
which yield the price equation ( 22) in the text.
2tao-veriod contracts
Aggregate equation (12) to obtain
(A17) a m t(1 - a}~l ~ 1Pt - y t-t l .y lEt-tPt i ~, Et-tPttt ' Y P nt-t
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The guess solution is




Et-iPt - Tomt-i t xint-i
Et-iPtti - xomt-i t x~P~lt-t
and hence (A17) becomes
(A19) Pt -~~a-, t xo - y To]mt-i t
( - at~ ~ 1 1
t lxi y xi t y Pxi t ~, PJ~t-~
By comparison of (A18) with (A19) we obtaín the coefficients of equation
(24):
(A20) xo - 1 r~ - P
atQ ~-P
(iii) Externalities
All other firms are in a one-period contract. Usíng the príce
equrilfon (22), the waqe for fírm "í" Ix glven by
(A21) a ( at~l ~ 1wit -.), Et-imt t ll -,r JEt-iPt t ~, Et-iPtfi t ~, Et-i~it
P- mt-i t at i-P ~t-i






mt - Pt - - at ,-P nt
1-p
EtPtt, -Pt - - ~ ~-P nt
wit-pc--Et-~P Et
a R(i-P) t tatQ ,-P) ~t - a~ ,-p nt Y ft
} at ,-P)~t t nt
-Yftt~ ,-P ft
which coincides with equation (25).
Let all other firms be in a two-period contract. The price is given
by equation (23), which immediately implies
(A24)
Then we have
wit - mt-, } ~p~ ~t-,
(A25a) mt - pt - Et - at~ ~-P ~t-,
(A25b) EtPtt, - Pt - ft t~~(P-P) nt-, t~(~-P ~t
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(A25c) wit -Pt-O
and by substitution in (6) we obtaín
(A26) 2it - a Ft - a} aP-P ~t-, t Q Ft t a~P(P-~) ~1t-~
} SP Et t P nt-i t ftaf ~-p
- (atR) Et t a~a}~-P ~t
which i s equation (28) in the text.
4. Countercvclical monev rule
(i) One-neriod contracts
The aggregate price is give.n by equatíon (10). Given the money
rule (31), the guess solutíon is
Pt -~amt t r,ft t xzOt
EtPt-i - ro(mt - b,ft - ó~~lt)
By substitution in (10) one obtains
(A29) Pt -
at~i mt - Sd,xo {t t i-9b r~tat at(i nF








Aggregating the wage equation (12) we obtain
(A31) Pt - y Et-,mt t ~1 -~~~ Et-,Pt
Q 1
4 .Y Et-,Ptt, t ;~ Et-,Tit
The guess solution is
(A32) Pt - xomt-, f x, ft-, t xz~lt-,
Take expectations of (A32) and substitute into (A31) to get
(A33)
from which
Pc - fy t xo - y xo~mt-,
}~y á~ t x~ - y~ '~ -~ d~xo~ft-,
} l- y b~ } x~ - y~ xz -~ á~ xo] ~It-,
xo - 1
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(A34) x~ - - ó~
xz - - bz
which give equation (33).
(iii) Externalities
Let us assume that all firms with the exception of firm "i" sign
one-period contracts. The wage equation (12) together with the price
equation (32) imply
(A35) wit - mt-i - b~ f t-~ - b~ T7t-i
The components of labour demand are
(A36a) mt - pt '~~ t- 1~2 Ot
(A36b) - ab ab tlEtptt~ - Pt - ~ ft - ~- Ot
wit - Pt --
at~(i-b )~t - 1-Qb Otat at
2it -~ íat~ - Qb~) tt t~ íl-~bz) ~It
which coincides with equation (35).
If instead all other firms are in a two-period contract, combine
equations (12) and (33) to obtain
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(A38) wit - mt-i - ai ft-i - dxnt-i - Pt
and
(A39a) mt - pt - ft
(A39b) Etptt~ - Pt -(1 - b~) Et - ó~qt
(A39c) wit - pt - 0




In the present Appendix we derive the critical conditions for negative
exfernnlittos ín contrnct length, undor the assumption [hnt current shoc~kr;
cannot be observed when contracts are signed. Our previous results are not
affected in any substantíal way by this change in the informational
assumptions of the model: the necessary and sufficient condition for
negative externalities is still shown to be given by
(equation (20) ín the text) for each of the cases that we consider.
We retain the assumption that the firms have the option of signing
either one- or two-period contracts. These are however redifined as
follows. In the one-period contract, firms set wages for time t at the end
of period t-1, before the shocks ft, qt are known: employment is ínstead
set after the uncertainty about the current shocks is resolved. In the
two-period contracts, wages are set at the end of period t-2.
Formally, the one-period contracts in the present context are
comparable to the two-period contracts of the analysis developed ín the
text and in Appendix A: we can thus use for the former the analytical
resul[s already obtained for the latter. The model is then given by the
money supply (2), the labour demand equation (6), and the wage setting
rules whích are derived below.
1. Uncorrelated shocks
(i) One-oeriod contracts
I.et the shock qt be a white noise process with variance Q~. Firm "i"
sets wit at [he end of period t-1 by solving the equation Et-~(lit)-0.
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Therefore the analysis can proceed as in section A.2.(ii), and the
solutíon for the price level is
(B1) pt - mt-i
(ií) Two-veriod contracts
If all firms are in the firat period of a two-period contract, prices
are given by equation (B1) above. I.et firms at time t be in the last
period of a two-period contract. Then
(B2)
wit - y Et-~ mt } l 1- y~ ~ Et-z pt
t ~ E p t 1 E ~y t-z tt, y t-a t
Aggrwgating,
(B3) a m t[ 1- ~~ , E p t ~ E ppt - y t-z y t-z t y t-: tt,
The guess solution for the level of prices has the form
(B4) pt - io mt-z
which of course also implies
(BS) E p - ,r mt-z t o t-2
By contrast, since there is no staggering, prices at tfl must be given
according to (B1) by
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Ptti - mt
Et-a Ptti - mt-z
By substitution of (BS) and (B7) into (B3) and solving we obtain
(BS) pt - mt-z
(iii) Externalities
When firm "i" is in the last period of a two-períod contract and all
other firms are in one-period contracts, we have pt - mt-~, Etptti - mt,





Et Ptti - Pt - Ft
wit - Pt - -Ft-i
The value of the externalities is thus
(B10) zit) - I(atR)~ } Y2~ QÉ t e~l
Suppose now that all firms are in the last period of a two-period
contract. Then pt - mt-z, Etptt~ - mt (since price setting is




mt - pt '~ t t f t-,
EtPtt, - Pt - Et t Et-~
wit-Pt-O
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The externalities are given by
(B12) zit) - 2(~~)~ aE } a~l
By comparing (B10) with (B12), the critical conditíon for negative
externalities from an increase in contract length is seen to be
Y ~ a ~ R
By contrast, if firm "i" is Ln the first period of a two-period
contract, its losses are easily shown to be independent of other firms'
contract length. Formally, if all firms are in one-períod contracts then





EtPtti - Pt - Et
wit-Pt-O
and its losses are
(B14) z('~) - (n~~)~ ~~ } o~i t E ,~
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If instead all firms, with the exceptíon of firm "i", are in the





mc - Pt ' F t t f t-,
EtPtt, - Pt ' ft t ft-,
at~
wit - Pt - ,~, f t-,
(B16) zi~~) - (atR): az t azF n
which coincides with (B14). Therefore, íf firm "i" signs short-term
contracts its losses do not depend on whether the other firms are in short
or long-term contracts. The intuition behind thís result is clear: in the
above framework, externalities arise due to the inability of firms to
adjust wages in the face of changes of the aggregate price level. When
firm "i" signs one-period contracts, it is at least as fast in adjusting
to aggregate shocks as the other firms. It is therefore always able to
react to any changes in aggregate prices. The losses (B14) (oz (B16)) are
indeed always lower than the expressions (B10) or (B12): they are thus
reduced to a level which cannot be further decreased gíven the information
lag ín the wage setting process.
This findíng is a general result, which does not depend on the absence
of serial correlation between the shocks nor on the assumed properties of
the money supply process. Hence, in the next sections of the present
Appendix we shall only compute the losses for the case in which firm "i"
is in the second period of a two-period contract.
2. Autocorrelated shocks
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The demand shock ~t evolves now according to equation (21) in the text:
~!t - P~1t-i f Et
If all firms sígn one-period contracts, the price level is given by
(B17) P - m t Pt t-i ~P~ ~t-t
In the second period of a two period contract, prices are
(B18) P~
pt - mt-~ } at~(~-pS ~t-z
I.et us now assume that firm "i" is in the second period of a
two-period contract. If all other other firms shift from one to two-period
contracts, firm "i" 's losses are respectívely given by
(B19) zit) - [(wp) 2i-y'] v~ f[(aF~) 2 t zpz] z
f at ( -P ac
and
(B20) zi~) - 2(ar{4):oa } (1tP2)(at~)~ s~ at -p oe
in the usual notation. Condition (20) still applies.
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3. Countercvclical monev rule
The monetary authorities follow the lagged feedback policy rule (31),
whl~'h is hrr.~ reporLCd for convenlence:
mt - mt-, t Ft - a,Et-, - a,~t-,
Under one-period contracts, the aggregate price level is
(B21) Pt ' mt-, - ó,ft-, - óznt-,
whilst in the second period of two-period contracts prices are
(B22) Pt - mt-z - ói~t-~ - ó:Ot-x
If firm "i" is in the second period of a two-period contract while all
other firms are in a one-period contract, then
(B23) zir) - 1[~Q(1-ó )]2t Yx(1-ó~)~) o~ t[(1-Qó~)2t 7~ó2~ a0
If all firms are in two-period contracts,
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( B24) ziC) - ([o-r~(1-ó~)1't (crt~)2í1-ó )~1 0~i
f [(1-~áz)~} (at~)~ózl an
and zit) ~ zit) iff at~ ~ y.
It is interesting to notice that in this case the monetary authorities
can no longer completely eliminate the losses by means of a suitable
choice of the policy parameters ó~ and b~. They can however still exert a
stabilízing influence, and indeed it would be easy to show that employment
variability would now be minimized by setting
(B25a) ó~ - 1 t ~~3
(B25b) á~ ~: - ~~
where
( y under one-period contracts
Sll at~ under two-period contracts
It is apparent that ó~, á2 as defined in (B25a), (B25b) do not reduce
the losses to zero. There exist externalities which cannot be removed by a
lagged-feedback policy rule. The reason for this is that, in the framework
considered here, wages and prices are entirely predetermíned, whilst
employment is free to react to contemporaneous disturbances.
Perfect stabílization is therefore no longer a feasible target. Active
policy ís however always capable of reducing the variability of the level
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of employment as compared to a situation of no intervention (b~ - á~ - 0).
Moreover, when short contracts prevail, the value of the externalities
in the absence of a feedback policy is given by
(B26) zit)I - [(nt6)2~Y~1 a~ ` onb~-b~-0
On the other hand, optimal policy reduces the losses from long contracts to
( z) a~(n2t2aR) (~R) 2 ~ (c~R)' ~(B27) zit I ~ ,~ [ t at 1 a f} t n}R Z a 0b~-ó~,bz-bz
Since (B27) is always smaller than (B26), we can restate the superiority
of active policy vis-à-vis wage flexibility.
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